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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This unlawful detainer case was decided on summary judgment by the trial court. 
The Utah Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction over this matter as an appeal 
from an order which did not fall under the original appellate jurisdiction of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. Utah Code § 78-2-2(3)0)0 996). Pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-
2(4), and Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Utah Supreme Court has 
transferred this matter to the Court of Appeals thus conferring appellate jurisdiction on 
this Court under Utah Code section 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The following issues are presented to this Court as a result of the trial court's 
decision on motion for summary judgment that Appellant had no interest in real property 
where he was living and, therefore, that he was subject to removal under Utah's unlawful 
detainer statute1: 
1. Issue: Did the trial court err in determining by summary judgment that 
1
 Transcripts of two different hearings were requested by Appellant and have been 
prepared for this Court. The dates of the transcripts are February 16, 1999 and May 9, 
1999. At some point in the transcription process the dates were switched with the 
transcript of the arguments on the summary judgment motion being dated May 9, 1999, 
and the transcript of the trial court's decision being dated February 16, 1999. Rather than 
referring to these hearings by date, this brief will refer to the transcript denominated as 
May 9, 1999, as the Motion Hearing and the transcript denominated as February 16, 1999 
as the Decision Hearing. 
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Appellee Michael Bowen, following his divorce from Appellee Kristen Hortin, retained 
an ownership interest in the real property which would allow him to interfere with the 
purchase of the property by Appellant from Hortin. 
Factual Preservation: This issue was argued at the Motion Hearing before the 
trial court and preserved for appeal when counsel for Appellant argued that Appellee 
Hortin was awarded the marital home subject to Appellee Bowen's equity interest and 
that Hortin had the right to sell the home to Appellant. Record at 276, p. 7. The trial 
court determined at the summary judgment Decision Hearing that any transfer of the 
home would require Appellee Bowen's approval and that the provision of the divorce 
decree ordering the Appellees to sign any necessary documents to implement the terms of 
the decree of divorce did not require Bowen to sign a deed to sell the home. Record at 
275, pp. 3, 5. 
Standard of Review: Summary judgment is only appropriate when there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. The facts and all reasonable inferences arising from those facts are viewed in a light 
most favorable to the non-moving party. Entitlement to summary judgment is a question 
of law with no deference given to the trial court's determination of the issues presented. 
Julian v. Petersen, 966 P.2d 878, 879 (Utah App. 1998). 
2. Issue: Did the trial court err in determining by summary judgment that the 
option agreement between Jones and Hortin was not extended through Hortin and 
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Bowen's acquiescence and Hortin's subsequent signing of closing documents which 
included provision for payment of accrued rent. 
Factual Preservation: At the Motion Hearing, Appellant raised the issue that 
his option agreement to purchase the property, although expiring by its terms prior to any 
closing, was extended through both the acquiescence and the bad faith acts of Bowen and 
Hortin. Record at 276, pp. 13-17. In announcing its decision, the trial court stated that 
there may be issues of fact which would need to be heard on the issue of extending the 
option to purchase but held that Jones' failure to make monthly payments on the property 
resulted in his having unclean hands and therefore was not entitled to equitable relief. 
Record at 275. pp. 2-4. 
Standard of Review: In considering an appeal of the grant of summary 
judgment, the facts and all reasonable inferences from them are reviewed in a light most 
favorable to the losing party. The legal conclusions reached by the trial court are 
accorded no deference but, instead, are reviewed for correctness. Holt v. Katsanevas, 854 
P.2d 575, 579 (Utah App. 1993). In cases involving equity, a reviewing court will reject 
the findings of a trial court if the evidence clearly preponderates against those findings or 
if there was a misapplication of the law. Ryan v. Earl 618 P.2d 54, 55 (Utah 1980). 
3. Issue: Assuming that Appellee Bowen's approval for the sale of the property 
to Appellant was not required and even if there was no extension of the option to 
purchase, did the trial court err by failing to find that Appellee Hortin created a new and 
3 
binding contract for the sale of property by signing closing documents including a 
warranty deed, or, in the alternative, does the merger doctrine apply to Appellee Hortin's 
actions. 
Factual Preservation: At the Motion Hearing, plaintiff raised the issue that the 
lease and option agreements did not control ownership of the property because a warranty 
deed had been signed by Appellant Hortin. Record at 276, p. 29. Counsel for Appellants 
acknowledged that if Hortin had "signed a contract to purchase or a deed perhaps they 
would have some kind of a point with regard to at least her agreeing to sell . . . " Id. pp. 
29-30. Because the trial court had ruled that Bowen's signature was required to sell the 
home, it did not decide this issue. Record at 275. pp. 4, 7-8. These issues were also 
raised by Jones in the fourth and fifth defenses of his answer where he claimed that title 
to the property should be quieted in him and that by executing the closing documents, 
appellee Hortin completed a contract for the sale of the property to Appellee. Record at 
18. 
Standard of Review: Whether a contract exists between parties is a question 
of law and the trial court's conclusion of law are reviewed under a correction of error 
standard. Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. Quintek. 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah App. 1992). 
Whether the doctrine of merger applies is a question of law that is reviewed for 
correctness with the reviewing court affording no particular deference to the trial court. 
Mavnard v. Wharton. 912 P.2d 446, 449 (Utah App. 1996). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provision(s) are either determinative of the appeal or are of 
central importance to the issues presented on appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1998). Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale, of 
any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to 
be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-8 (1998). Right to specific performance not affected. 
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to abridge the powers of 
courts to compel the specific performance of agreements in case of part performance 
thereof. 
5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action for eviction was filed on December 10, 1998. The plaintiffs below and 
appellants on appeal Michael Bowen (hereinafter Bowen) and Kristen Hortin (hereinafter 
Hortin) alleged in their complaint that defendant and appellee Teak D. Jones (hereinafter 
Jones) was renting property from them, that Jones had been served with a five day notice 
to vacate the property and had failed to comply therewith. Bowen and Hortin sought 
judgment for past due rent, attorneys fees and an order of eviction. Jones answered the 
complaint alleging that he had the right to possess the property by virtue of a lease and 
option agreement to purchase the property under which he had tendered payment but 
which tender had been refused by Bowen. A possession bond was filed by Bowen and 
Hortin and Jones filed a counter possession bond. 
Hortin and Bowen filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on January 15, 1999. 
This was supported by an affidavit signed by Bowen (hereinafter "Bowen Affi"). Jones 
filed an opposition memorandum and affidavit (hereinafter "Jones Aff.") on January 25, 
1999. Hortin and Bowen filed their responsive memorandum on January 26, 1999. On 
February 16, 1999, the trial court held a Motion Hearing at which counsel for both sides 
appeared and made their respective arguments. Based on questions raised at that hearing, 
the trial court allowed the parties to file supplemental information to assist the court in 
making its decision. Jones filed and amended memorandum opposing summary judgment 
on February 18, 1999, and Hortin and Bowen filed their response to Jones' amended 
6 
opposition memorandum on February 23, 1999. On April 9, 1999, the trial court held a 
hearing at which the judge informed the parties she was granting Hortin and Bowen's 
motion for summary judgment (the Decision Hearing). Counsel for Hortin and Bowen 
was directed to prepare the order. The order granting the motion for summary judgment 
was signed on April 26, 1999. 
Following the Decision Hearing several other motions immaterial to the issues 
presented on appeal were filed, including a request by Jones' counsel that he be allowed 
to withdraw. Ultimately, on May 11, 1999, the trial court allowed counsel for Jones to 
withdraw and directed that the writ of restitution removing Jones the property be 
enforced. Jones obtained new counsel who filed a motion for extension of time to file a 
notice of appeal on May 13, 1999. Hortin and Bowen joined together to oppose the 
extension of time to file an appeal, however the trial court signed an order granting that 
motion on July 9, 1999, and the order was entered on July 13, 1999. Jones filed his 
Notice of Appeal on Monday, July 19, 1999. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. During their marriage, Bowen and Hortin acquired a home located at 2614 
North 700 East, North Ogden, Weber County, Utah. Record at 59-60, T| 12. The deed 
conveyed the home to Bowen and Hortin as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship 
and not as tenants in common. Record at 160. 
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2. Several years later, on or about July 16, 1996, Bowen and Hortin were divorced 
and a decree of divorce was entered in the Second Judicial District Court of Weber 
County, Ogden Department. The Decree of Divorce contained provisions relating to 
possession of the home, responsibility for debt on the home and described the financial 
rights as between Bowen and Hortin to the home. Record at 56-64. 
3. Bowen was ordered to pay alimony to Hortin until such time as she remarried, 
graduated from college or acquired full time employment. However, in no event was 
alimony to continue beyond August 1, 2000. The timing contained in the alimony 
provision affected Bowen's equity interest in the home. Record at 59-60, ]flj 8, 12. 
4. The Decree of Divorce provided that Bowen would maintain an interest in the 
home until it was sold or until the alimony obligation terminated. At that point, Bowen's 
financial interest in the home would become fixed. Bowen's interest was to be in the 
form of a non-interest bearing lien equal to one-half of the equity in the home as that 
equity was agreed upon between Hortin and Bowen or as established by an appraisal. 
The Decree then contains directions for when Bowen's equity interest would actually be 
paid to him. Record at 59-60, |^ 12. 
5. The Decree gave Hortin possession of the home and directed her to pay the 
mortgage loan payments as well as the balance of all home equity loans. Record at 59-60, 
1112-13. 
6. On or about March 6, 1997, Hortin contracted with Jones to list the home for 
8 
sale for a six month period. Bowen did not sign the listing agreement. Record at 54 j^ 3 
(Jones Aff). 
7. During the listing period, Hortin accepted two different offers on the home 
without also obtaining Bowen's signature. Neither sale was completed. Record at 69, f 4 
(Jones Aff). 
8. On or about December 17, 1997, Hortin and Jones entered into a lease 
agreement and option to purchase the home. Record at 66-67. 
9. Although Bowen eventually signed his name to both the lease and the option 
agreement, he was not a named party to either contract. The lease and option were to 
expire in July 1998. Record at 66-67. 
10. At some point after the lease and option agreements were signed, Jones took 
possession of the property. Record at 71-72, ^ | 14-15 (Jones Aff). Jones remained there 
until the trial court ordered his removal. Record at 275, p. 6. 
11. Jones did not tender payment or close the transaction within the time period 
set forth on the face of the option agreement. Record at 37, ^ J 4 (Bowen Aff.). 
12. During the period of Jones' occupation of the property, he made two payments 
representing approximately four months worth of rental payments. It is undisputed that 
Jones failed to make regular monthly rental payments. Record at 37, J^ 4 (Bowen Aff.). 
13. In May 1998, prior to the expiration of the first option agreement, Bowen 
obtained another document entitled, Lease and Option to Purchase with an expiration date 
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of August 31, 1998. Record at 37, fflf 1-2 (Bowen Aff.). 
14. There is a dispute as to whether this second document ever became operative 
between the parties and the trial court did not rely on this document or the deadlines 
contained therein in making its order at the Decision Hearing. Record at 275, p. 2. 
15. Neither the first or second option agreements were extended in writing. 
Record at 37, ^  3 (Bowen Aff.). 
16. In November 1998, after both option agreements had expired by their terms, 
Jones' wife, Diana Marie Harrison (hereinafter "Harrison"), who was not a party to this 
action in the trial court, was substituted for Jones on the closing documents. Record at 
37-38, H 5 (Bowen Aff). 
17. On or about November 12. 1998, Hortin signed the necessan documents to 
close the sale of the home. Hortin signed the documents at St. George, Washington 
County, Utah and then sent them to a title company in Ogden. Record at 87-95. 
18. The closing documents included a warranty deed signed by Hortin and 
conveying the property to Harrison together with a settlement statement containing the 
purchase price of the home and other financial information regarding the sale of the home 
including an option payment to cover unpaid rent on the property equal to five months 
worth of rent. Record at 93, 95. 
19. On August 31, 1998, Jones was delinquent in the payment of rent in an 
amount equal to two months worth of rent. That amount would have grown to equal five 
10 
months worth of rent at the end of November, 1998. Record at 38, ^  9 (Bowen Aff). 
20. Bowen did not sign the closing documents or the warranty deed transferring 
the property to Harrison. Record at 87-95. 
21. On November 25, 1988, almost two weeks after Hortin signed the closing 
documents, Bowen and Hortin caused a five day notice to vacate to be delivered to the 
Weber County Sheriff. Record at 38, f^ 6 (Bowen Aff). The notice was posted on the 
property on or about November 30, 1998 and was mailed to Jones on or about December 
1, 1998. Record at 38, ^  6 (Bowen Aff). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court failed to properly establish Bowen's interest in the property at the 
time that Hortin attempted to sell the property to Jones. Following the entry of the 
Bowen-Hortin divorce decree, Bowen's interest in the property was governed by the 
language of that decree. At the time Hortin signed the closing papers, if Bowen was no 
longer paying alimony, then his only interest in the home was financial and he would not 
have needed to sign the closing documents. On the other hand, if Bowen was still paying 
alimony and had an ownership interest in the property, his signature would have been 
required to complete the sale of the property to Jones or Jones' assignee. Because the 
trial court examined only the decree and did not investigate the facts surrounding whether 
Bowen was still paying alimony, it could not draw the legal conclusion that Jones did not 
have an interest in the property based on Bowen's failure to signed the closing documents 
or any extension to the option agreement. In addition, if Bowen acted unreasonably in 
withholding his signature from the closing documents, the trial court should have 
compelled his assistance in completing the sale of the property to Jones. 
Although the written option agreement between Hortin and Jones (which had also 
been assented to by Bowen) had expired, the trial court should have heard additional facts 
as to whether Hortin and Bowen were estopped from asserting the statute of frauds as a 
defense to Jones' claim that he, or his assignee, had an interest in the property. Despite 
the fact that the option agreement expired in July, 1998, the parties continued to follow a 
12 
course of conduct suggesting that the option agreement was still being held open. The 
most obvious evidence of this is the signing by Hortin of closing documents in November 
1998. Bowen, both by his silence and his failure to act until after the attempted closing in 
November 1998, should be estopped from asserting the statute of frauds. Jones changed 
his position in reliance on the non-written extension of the option contract. Jones also 
partially performed under the oral extension thus justifying a departure from the statute of 
frauds. The trial court essentially acknowledged that this was a factual question, however 
it found that Jones had failed to make monthly rental payments under his lease agreement, 
and therefore, that he was not entitled to equitable relief. However, the trial court's 
conclusion was in error because it failed to acknowledge that at the time of the attempted 
closing, a payment for past due rent was included in the closing documents. Jones 
tendered payment of the amount in question, and even though his tender was rejected, he 
is entitled to a factual hearing regarding his equitable claims. 
The case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether Hortin entered 
into a new contract to sell the property by signing a warranty deed and other closing 
documents in November 1998. Even if the option agreement between Jones and Hortin 
and assented to by Bowen had expired and was not extended, Hortin's actions in 
accepting the terms contained in the closing documents created a new and valid contract 
for the sale of the property. In the alternative, if a new contract was not created, because 
a warranty deed was signed by Hortin in November, 1998, the terms of the underlying 
13 
option agreement would have been merged into the warranty deed and any right on the 
part of Bowen and Hortin to argue that the option had expired or the lease terminated 
would have been extinguished. The trial court did not review these issues because Bowen 
had not signed the closing documents. However, the factual issue of whether Bowen 
unreasonably withheld his signature from the sales documents and should be required to 
participate in the closing was not addressed below. If Bowen's failure to participate was 
unreasonable, this new or merged transaction should have been recognized as valid and 
Jones' presence on the property could not be challenged by Hortin and Bowen. 
14 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court in this matter determined on Hortin's and Bowen's motion for 
summary judgment that Jones had no interest in the property where Jones was residing 
and therefore, that he was subject to removal as a tenant at will. However, significant 
factual issues are present in this case which must be fully heard prior to making a ruling 
that Jones was not entitled to possession of the property. They include: (1) the effect of 
Bowen and Hortin's decree of divorce on the ability of Bowen to interfere with Jones" 
purchase of the real property; (2) whether Jones or his assignee was entitled to an 
extension of time to perform under the option contract even though there was no written 
extension of the option: and (3) even if the option agreement was not extended, whether 
Hortin's actions of signing all of the closing documents, including a warranty deed, 
created a new contract for the sale of the property or resulted in merger of the prior 
agreements with the deed. Because the key facts relating to these issues are in dispute, 
the case should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 
I. THERE IS A MATERIAL FACTUAL DISPUTE AS TO WHAT KIND 
OF INTEREST BOWEN HAD IN THE PROPERTY AT THE TIME OF 
THE SALE, AND IF HE HAD AN OWNERSHIP INTEREST, A 
QUESTION AS TO WHETHER BOWEN UNREASONABLY 
WITHHELD HIS CONSENT TO THE SALE. 
15 
A. The Bowen-Hortin Divorce Decree Altered Bowen 's Rights To The Property 
And Controls Bowen fs Ability To Interfere With Any Sale Of The Property 
Because Bowen and Hortin are divorced, their Decree of Divorce supercedes their 
deed as to their respective ownership interests in the property. Although Bowen and 
Hortin were, and still are, joint tenants of the property with full rights of survivorship, that 
condition is modified by the fact that Bowen and Hortin are now divorced and their 
respective interests in the property have been altered by their decree of divorce. For 
example, if either Bowen or Hortin were to die, it cannot be contended that the survivor 
would be entitled to receive the property by right of survivorship. See Utah Code Ann. § 
75-2-804(2)(b)(1998). A court in a divorce action has the authority to make orders 
relating to the property, debts and obligations of the parties to the divorce. Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-5(l)(1999 Supp.). Included in this power is the ability of a trial court to 
award the marital home to one party or another. In this case, the trial court reviewed the 
decree of divorce and determined, without taking evidence on the issue, that Bowen's 
retained interest in the home required his approval prior to the closing between Harrison 
and Hortin. 
The issue which requires additional factual review, is what Bowen's retained 
interest actually entitled him to do with regard to the sale of the marital home. There are 
several Utah cases which illustrate the need for a trial court to make a determination as to 
what interests a spouse retains prior to deciding sales contract issues. One case which 
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closely matched the facts at issue here is Krantz v. Holt, 819 P.2d 352 (Utah 1991). In 
Krantz, the purchaser had signed an earnest money sales agreement to buy property from 
a divorced woman. 819 P.2d at 353. The agreement required approval by the woman's 
ex-husband, Stephen Holt. IcL The property was titled in joint tenancy between Holt and 
his ex-wife, the decree of divorce had not been recorded and Holt had not deeded the 
property to his wife. IcL However, there was also evidence that Holt's interest had been 
terminated by virtue of a divorce decree. The Krantz court stated that if "Holt retained a 
joint interest in the property, his written consent to the property's sale would be 
necessary, not because of any clause in the agreement, but because the Utah statute of 
frauds so requires." 819 P.2d at 353. That court went on to clarify that "there would be 
no such requirement if. as Krantz contends, Stephen Holt retained no interest in the 
property pursuant to the divorce decree." IdL at 354. Under those circumstances, an oral 
rather than written assent to the sale would have satisfied the agreement. The Krantz 
court found that "the issue of whether Stephen Holt had a joint interest in the property 
during the relevant dates of this case is a question of fact. Because there are outstanding 
questions of fact regarding Holt's ex-husband's approval of the transfer, summary 
judgment cannot be sustained on this ground." Icf As in Krantz, the factual issues that 
must be resolved in this case relate to the need for appellee Bowen to approve a sale of 
property where, like Holt, his name appeared on the public records as a joint tenant and a 
divorce decree dealing with the property has been entered but not recorded and no deed 
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has been signed by him to Hortin. 
In this case, the trial court was provided a copy of the decree of divorce for Bowen 
and Hortin. The language describing Bowen's interest is where the focus of any analysis 
should rest. The decree contains a two step process for Bowen to receive his financial 
interest out of the home. The first step has to do with the fixing or establishment of the 
amount of Bowen's interest. The decree states that at the time Bowen ceases paying 
alimony, the amount of his interest would be set at one half of the equity in the home. 
The amount of equity was to be determined by either an appraisal or by agreement 
between Bowen and Hortin. The second step set in the decree governs the timing of any 
payment to Bowen of his financial interest. The decree states that after the first step was 
completed, Bowen would have a non-interest bearing lien equal to the amount of his 
financial interest in the home. In this case the trial court took no evidence and made no 
factual or legal determination as to whether Bowen was still paying alimony, and even if 
he was, how his interest in the home would have changed depending on whether he was 
in the first or second step of the divorce decree's plan. Without this information, the trial 
court could not rule on summary judgment that Jones did not have the right to remain on 
the property. 
The relevance of where Bowen stood in the two step process is highlighted in 
Booth v. Booth, 772 P.2d 771 (Utah 1986). In Booth, an ex-husband was ordered by the 
lower court to sign documents to accomplish the sale of the marital home. 722 P.2d at 
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771. The decree in that case "awarded the real property of the parties" to the ex-wife, 
however the ex-husband's financial interest would not become fixed until the home was 
actually sold. Id Following the entry of the decree, the ex-wife placed the home on the 
market and received an offer lower than she had hoped for. I d The ex-husband refused 
to sign the necessary documents to close the sale believing that the home was worth more 
than was offered. The trial court found that the ex-wife owned the property and that the 
ex-husband had no right to participate in the sale and ordered him 1o sign the sale 
documents. I d The Utah Supreme Court found that the decree did not award sole 
ownership of the home to the ex-wife. The court found that a significant factor in 
deciding that the husband still had an ownership interest in the home was that the decree 
did "not award defendant a fixed amount which is secured by a lien on the property and 
made payable at the time the property is sold . . . . Because his share was dependent on 
the sales price eventually realized, he was vitally interested in any sale." I d at 771-772. 
However the Supreme Court also noted that when the amount of a former spouses interest 
in a home is fixed by the trial court, "[s]uch an arrangement would be wholly consistent 
with full ownership in plaintiff [the ex-wife]. In such a case, defendant's only interest in 
a sale would be that enough money was generated to pay his fixed award." I d at 772. 
Based on those facts, the Booth court concluded that the decree was "more consistent and 
reasonable if interpreted to mean that possession was awarded to plaintiff but ownership 
remained jointly with the parties." I d In light of the fact that Hortin signed a listing 
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agreement with Jones and that Hortin accepted several offers on the home and that she 
also negotiated the terms of the option contract with Jones, there is a substantial question 
as to what type of interest Bowen had in the property. In fact, following the filing of the 
Notice of Appeal, Hortin filed additional documents in the trial court in which she claims 
the sole right to recover the judgment obtained against Jones because she is the possessor 
of the real property and has been solely responsible for the mortgage payments thereon. 
The distinction made in Booth between a fixed interest and one that is subject to 
change is of particular relevance to this case. The two step process contained in the 
Bowen-Hortin decree contemplates that for so long as Bowen pays alimony, his interest 
in the marital home can go up or down. However, once his alimony obligation ceased, 
Bowen* s financial interest in the home would become fixed and at that point he would be 
nothing more than a lien-holder awaiting payment of his share of the equity. What is fatal 
to the trial court's decision is its failure to determine whether Bowen was still paying 
alimony at the time Hortin signed the closing documents and the warranty deed in 
November 1998. If Bowen's interest in the home was not fixed, he had an ownership 
interest that would require his signature. If, on the other hand, his interest was fixed, full 
ownership would be in Hortin and she would be able to convey the property by her 
signature alone, subject to the payment of Bowen's lien interest. Because the trial court 
did not receive this factual information, the case must be remanded for a determination of 
Bowen's interest in the property and the need for him to sign any closing documents. 
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B. Assuming That Bowen Had The Right To Approve Or Disapprove Of A 
Proposed Transfer Of The Property, The Question Remains Whether He 
Unreasonably Withheld That Approval 
If Bowen does have an ownership interest in the home requiring his signature to 
validate any sale, this case would still need additional review by the trial court. The 
reason for this is that even if Bowen's signature is required to complete the sale of the 
property, the trial court must also determine whether he unreasonably withheld his 
signature. If so, his signature may be compelled. Booth provides guidance on this point 
as well. In Booth, even though the appellate court found that the ex-husband had an 
ownership right in the home, it still affirmed the lower court's order requiring him to sign 
the sale documents. 722 P.2d at 772. The reason for affirmance was that even though the 
ex-husband had a right to participate in the sale of the property, "he did not have the right 
to unreasonable withhold his consent to a sale to a buyer found by plaintiff." IdL The 
Booth court noted that the home had been listed for a period of approximately nine 
months and the ex-husband had participated in decisions to decline prior offers. In 
addition, the ex-husband in Booth made no effort to find a buyer who would pay more 
nor had he shown that the terms of the sale were unreasonable or inequitable to the 
parties. IdL 
In this case, there is a significant question of fact as to whether Bowen acted 
unreasonably. Based on information provided to the trial court, from the time that Hortin 
21 
signed the original listing agreement until she signed the closing documents a period of 
approximately twenty months passed (March 1997 to November 1998). Two prior sales 
had fallen through for the price identified in the divorce decree as the estimated fair 
market value of the home. Bowen was aware of the option agreement signed by Hortin 
and Jones and even added his signature to that document. Although Bowen did sign the 
first option agreement, the trial court did not receive evidence as to the reason why his 
signature was obtained. The facts as previously alleged by Jones was that this signature 
was obtained in order to avoid problems when closing as to the amount of the proceeds to 
be distributed to Bowen from the sale. In addition, using the option agreement adopted 
by the trial court, the option period ended in July 1998. Even using the option agreement 
identified in the complaint the option period ended August 31, 1998. However, Jones 
was not served with a five day notice to vacate until late November 1998 and the instant 
action was not brought until December 1998. Both of these actions occurred after the 
closing documents were signed by Hortin. The delay in bringing this action combined 
with the fact that Bowen refused to sign the closing documents which would have paid all 
past due rent suggests at least the possibility of unreasonableness on the part of Bowen. 
This factual issue should also be addressed by the trial court in determining whether 
Bowen could withhold his signature and terminate the sale of the home. 
22 
II HORTIN AND BOWEN'S ACTIONS CREATE A QUESTION OF FACT 
AS TO WHETHER JONES' OPTION TO PURCHASE WAS 
EXTENDED ORALLY OR THE CONTRACT WAS REMOVED FROM 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
There are additional disputed facts regarding whether appellant was given an 
extension of the option to purchase the real property. Because an option to purchase real 
estate is subject to the statute of frauds, ordinarily an extension of an option must also be 
in writing. Holt v. Katsanevas, 854 P.2d 575, 579 (Utah App. 1993), see also Utah Code 
Ann. § 25-5-3 (1998). However, there are exceptions to this rule, and M[w]hen an oral 
contract otherwise prohibited by the statute of frauds becomes enforceable because of part 
performance or otherwise, the Statute doe not prevent the enforcement of the remaining 
promises." Katsanevas, 854 P.2d at 580 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
A. Unresolved Facts Can Be Understood To Show That Jones Changed His 
Position In Reliance On A Non-Written Extension To The Option Agreement 
In affidavits provided to the trial court and on oral argument, Jones presented facts 
suggesting that he had changed his position in reliance on oral modifications to the first 
option agreement. A party seeking to enforce an oral modification may rely on the fact 
that he has changed his position in defeating the statute of frauds. 
If a party has changed his position by performing an oral modification so 
that it would be inequitable to permit the other party to found a claim upon 
the original agreement as unmodified or defeat the former's claim by setting 
up a defense that performance was not according to the written contract, 
after he has induced or consented to the former going forward, the modified 
agreement should be held valid. 
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Bamberger Co. v. Certified Productions. Inc., 48 P.2d 489, 492 (1935), aff d on rehearing, 
53 P.2d 1153 (1936). In Jones' Affidavit, he contended that Bowen had interfered with 
the implementation of the lease and option agreement and that Hortin repeatedly agreed 
that Jones could have more time to make improvements to the property and complete the 
option agreement. Record at 71-73, ^ 14-19 (Jones Aff). If these facts are found to be 
true, then Jones' efforts to improve the property beyond the option period of July 4, 1998, 
would reflect that he had altered his position in reliance on oral statements and the efforts 
by Bowen and Hortin to disaffirm the oral changes and require enforcement of the 
original contract would be inequitable. 
After hearing factual evidence, if the trial court were to determine that Bowen's 
signature was necessary to effect a sale of the property, then his agreement vvould be 
needed to extend the option period. The case of Coombs v. Ouzounian, greatly relied on 
by Bowen in the trial court, stands for the proposition that when property is owned by 
more than one person, all owners signatures are required to extend an option contract. 
465 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1970). However, the factual dispute in this case, as identified 
previously, is whether Bowen was even in a position to sign any documents with respect 
to the property. If Bowen's signature was not needed, then Hortin could unilaterally 
extend the option period. It is hard to see how Hortin could now argue that she did not 
agree to extend the option period when she actually signed closing documents. 
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B. Disputed Facts Have Not Been Resolved Regarding Whether Jones Partially 
Performed The Non-Written Extension To The Option Agreement 
The oral extension of Jones' option will also be exempt from a statute of frauds 
defense if he can show partial performance under the oral extension. The statute of frauds 
"shall [not] be construed to abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific 
performance of agreements in case of part performance thereof" Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-
8 (1998). This exception to the statute of frauds has been interpreted to apply when 
"there is 'sufficient performance on the part of [one party] exclusively referable to the 
alleged contract to exempt it from the effect of the statute of frauds.'" Holt v. Katsanevas, 
854 P.2d 575, 580 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Ryan v. Earl 618 P.2d 54, 55 (Utah 1980). 
According to Jones' Affidavit, he performed sendees and improvements on the property 
based on the extension of the option to purchase agreement and he also worked with a 
financing company well beyond the July closing date identified in 1he option in an effort 
to complete the transaction. Record at 71-73, ^ 14-20 (Jones Aff). Both of these 
actions would not have been undertaken for any other reason other than the extension of 
the option contract. The alleged facts surrounding the attempt to close the transaction 
plainly show that there was at least part performance of the contract extension exclusively 
referable to the extended option agreement thereby justifying removal of the contract 
from the statute of frauds. 
The larger question, however, is if Bowen did have an interest in the property 
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requiring his signature, whether he is estopped from relying on the statute of frauds as a 
defense to his failure to sign the closing documents Even Coombs recognizes that an 
extension of an option agreement may be enforced in the absence of a writing if estoppel 
is present 465 P 2d 358 Based on the facts available to the trial court, Bowen had 
signed the first option and was aware of the dates contained therein Bowen was 
presumptively aware of Jones' occupation and efforts on the property and Bowen's 
decision to remain silent until after receiving the closing documents and refusing to sign 
them indicates that he should not be allowed to rely on the statute of frauds to prosecute 
his claim 
C The Trial Court Ei / ed In Finding That Jones Was Not Entitled To Equitable 
Relief Based On Unclean Hands 
The trial court recognized that Bow en's interference with the closing of the 
transaction may be a fact sensitive action Decision Hearing p 4 However, the trial 
court went on to hold that because Tones did not make timely rental payments he was 
therefore precluded from seeking equitable relief from the statute of frauds Id_ While 
Jones did not contest this fact, the court failed to take into account that he had tendered 
the back rent as part of the attempted closing This occurred prior to the service of the 
five day notice to vacate and prior to his raising the defense of estoppel The Utah 
Supreme Court has recognized that generally, "in a suit for specific performance of a 
contract for the sale of realty, the purchaser must show that he paid the purchase price, or 
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tendered it, to the defendant prior to the commencement of the suit." Reed v. Alvey, 610 
P.2d 1374, 1379 (Utah 1980). In this case, there is evidence that this in fact occurred. In 
his affidavit, Bowen alleges that Jones was two months delinquent in his rent at the end of 
August 1998. At the time Hortin signed the closing documents, five moths would have 
been due. Based on the contract rental rate of $648.00 per month, the amount owed 
equaled $3,240.00. The Escrow Settlement Statement provided to the trial court ands 
signed by Hortin, shows a line for an option payment to Hortin in the amount of 
$3,240.00, the exact amount of the deficiency. The trial court's failure to recognize this 
tender denied Jones of equitable relief that he at least arguable had a claim to. In order to 
rectify this error, the case should be remanded to the trial court for a determination of 
whether Bowen and Hortin, by their statements, actions, and silence, are estopped from 
asserting the statute of frauds as a defense to the extension of the first option agreement 
under either the theory of changed position or partial performance. 
III. BECAUSE HORTIN SIGNED CLOSING DOCUMENTS, A 
SIGNIFICANT QUESTION OF FACT EXISTS AS TO WHETHER A 
NEW CONTRACT BETWEEN HERSELF AND JONES CAME INTO 
BEING OR WHETHER ANY PRIOR AGREEMENTS WERE MERGED 
INTO THE WARRANTY DEED AND WHETHER BOWEN 
UNREASONABLY WITHHELD HIS SIGNATURE. 
Even if the facts in dispute show that Jones was not entitled to rely on the option 
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contract, the trial court should still have heard evidence as to whether by signing closing 
documents, Hortin thereby entered into a new and binding contract with Jones or his 
assignee for the sale and purchase of the property. If Hortin did in fact do so, and if 
Bowen had more than a financial interest in the property, the trial court must also 
determine if Bowen was justified in his refusal to accept this new contract. Bowen and 
Hortin have argued below that because the option expired by its terms and because they 
believe that Jones could not prove an extension to the option nor could he prove the 
elements of estoppel, that therefore, he had not right to remain on the property. However, 
this argument ignores the fact that a new contract may have been formed or that by 
signing closing documents, the option was merged with the warranty deed. 
A. By Signing Closing Documents, Hortin May Have Entered Into A New 
Contract To Sell The Property 
The deed signed by Hortin, together with the closing documents, evidence material 
facts that a new and binding contract for the sale of land had been entered into. A partial 
list of elements required to establish a contract for the sale of land is contained in 
Property Assistance Corp. v. Roberts, 768 P.2d 976 (Utah App. 1989). The list in 
Roberts includes: (1) an adequate description of the property to be sold; (2) evidence of 
consideration or of a purchase price; and (3) information regarding when and where 
settlement shall occur. kf at 978. Other elements of a valid land contract would likely 
include identification of the parties to the contract, words indicating an intent to sell and 
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the signature of the seller. See Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1998). ]f these elements are 
found to be present in a document or related documents, then a court should determine 
that a valid and binding contract for the sale and purchase of property exists. 
In this case, even if Jones and Hortin had not entered into a prior option 
agreement, the existence of these elements in subsequent documents would establish a 
completely separate contract for the sale of the property. The trial court did not take any 
evidence as to whether the closing documents signed and submitted by Hortin in this case 
met these elements. Its reason for not examining this issue was likely that because 
Bowen had not signed the documents, it was immaterial what Hortin had done or signed. 
However, this assumption is erroneous. The first reason that this is error is based on 
Bow en's interest in the property. If he had only a financial interest, as described above, 
he would not need to sign any of the sales documents. In addition, even if he had a more 
general ownership interest, he may still be compelled to sign Ihe documents based on the 
unreasonableness standard of Booth. Booth, 722 P.2d 772. In affirming the requirement 
set by the lower court that the unreasonable spouse sign sale documents, the Booth court 
recognized the importance of not allowing a former spouse to hold a transaction hostage. 
"Plaintiff [willing spouse], too, was interested in having the properly sold, and her rights, 
as well as those of defendant's [unreasonable spouse], must be considered.'1 IcL Thus, 
even if Hortin had accepted the terms present here in November 1998 from an individual 
with whom she had had no prior contact, there would be a material issue of fact as to 
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whether a contract had been created which, assuming Bowen had an ownership interest in 
the property, Bowen would have been required to accept. 
B. Hortin 's Signature On The Closing Documents May Have Served To Merge All 
Prior Agreements Into The Warranty Deed 
By signing a warranty deed and delivering it to the title company chosen by Jones, 
Hortin may have invalidated any argument that Jones was in violation of the option and 
lease agreement because any prior obligations under those documents were merged into 
the deed. Under the doctrine of merger, "upon delivery and acceptance of a deed, the 
provisions of the underlying contract for the conveyance are deemed extinguished or 
superseded by the deed." G.G.A.. Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 84L 844 (Utah App. 1989). 
In addition, the deed itself essentially serves as a final real estate contract and n[p]arties to 
real estate transactions must ensure that any agreements involving conveyance of title are 
incorporated into the final closing document, which is usually a warranty deed." 
Mavnard v. Wharton. 912 P.2d 446, 450-451 (Utah App. 1996). Again, in this case, the 
trial court did not analyze the role of the merger doctrine because Bowen had not signed 
the closing documents including the warranty deed. However, for the same reasons 
identified in the new contract argument, the trial court erred and should have conducted a 
factual investigation into whether any alleged problems with the option or lease 
agreement were merged into the final signed documents and whether Bowen should be 
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required to sign the closing documents. 
The doctrine of merger does have four exceptions which would preclude 
application of the doctrine. These are (1) mutual mistake in the drafting of final 
documents, (2) ambiguity in the final documents, (3) existence of rights collateral to the 
contract of sale and (4) fraud in the transaction. Id However, each of these exceptions 
also require factual development before they may be invoked. Because the deed 
presented to the trial court did not contain any exceptions to the transfer of title, this case 
should be remanded for an assessment of whether the merger doctrine extinguishes any 
claim that Jones' or Harrison was not entitled to purchase the property because the option 
agreement had expired. 
CONCLUSION 
The rights retained by Bowen following the entry of the decree of divorce and at 
the time the closing documents on the home were signed are contested and require further 
review. Because the trial court did not determine the nature of Bowen's interest in the 
home by receiving facts, it is unclear whether or not his signature was required to close 
the sale of the home. This case should be remanded to the trial court for that 
determination as well as a determination of all other matters, as described above, which 
would follow a finding that Bowen either had or did not have an ownership interest in the 
home. If Bowen did an ownership interest in the home, the trial court must determine 
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whether the statute of frauds is inapplicable due to equitable principles, and, even if the 
statute of frauds did apply to void the non-written extension to the option, whether Bowen 
unreasonably withheld his consent to a completely new or merged transaction. 
DATED this Z _ day of March, 2000. 
/ ' • - * - • / 
MiRK H. STRATFORD c [_y 
Attorney for Appellant Teak D. Jones 
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matter, by mailing it by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following 
address: 
ROGER F. BARON 
Attorney for Appellee Michael Bowen 
45 North 100 East 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
KRISTEN HORTIN 
Appellee 
2614 N. 700 E. 
North Ogden, Utah 84404 
HJH-^ 
Mark H. Stratford ^ 











ily, Uloh 84302 
734-9464 
734-9151 
ROGER F. BARON #0225 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS 
45 NORTH 100 EAST 
BRIGHAM CITY, UT 84302 
(435) 734-9464 
W\ \!1 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL BOWEN & KRISTEN HORTIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TEAK D. JONES, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
""W * 
Case No. 980908407 
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Plaintiff Michael Bowen, having been duly sworn on oath, hereby states as follows: 
1. On or about the 5th day of May. 1998. Plaintiffs and defendant executed an agreement 
entitled LEASE AND OPTION TO PURCHASE as set forth in the Memorandum. 
2. The term of the lease was stated to be March 1, 1998 to August 31, 1998. Said lease 
further provided for lease payments of $648.00 per month and specified that time was of the 
essence. 
3. There was never an agreement in writing between all parties to extend the lease or 
option. 
4. The defendant failed to make all the lease payments due under the lease. Funher. the 
defendant did not exercise his option prior to the August 31, 1998 deadline. 
5. On November 25, 1998, the defendant attempted to assign his expired interest in the 
BOWEN VS JONES 
97-119 1 
RSON & BARON 
underson 
Barcn 
/i at Law 
h First East 
i Gfy, Utah 84302 
5) 734-9464 
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lease and option to purchase to a Diana Marie Harrison as per the exhibit to the Memorandum. 
6. Also on November 25, 1998, the plaintiffs mailed a 5 day notice to vacate to the 
Weber County Sheriff to be served on the defendant. This notice was served by the Weber 
County Sheriff by posting the same on the door of the residence on November 30th, 1998 and 
mailing a copy of the same by mailing to the defendant on December 1, 1998. 
7. On December 16, 1998, the Defendant was served with the Complaint and Summons 
in the present matter and subsequently posted a counterbond. 
8. In November of 1998, the defendant attempted to exercise his option by selling the 
property to a third party. As mentioned above, the defendant later assigned his interest in the 
lease and option to a different 3rd party. As part of that transaction, the defendant proposed to 
pay past lease payments (thereby admitting that he had not paid all lease payments due under the 
agreement.) No document accepting the attempted late exercise was ever drafted or signed and 
the defendant has never paid the past due payments. 
9. The defendant was in default on rent as of the last dav of the lease in the amount of 
$i/ZfH£$r The defendant has paid no rent since that date and the plaintiffs are entitled to a 
reasonable amount for rent in the amount specified in the contract to the present date of 
$ ZZ Vo — 
Dated this /_$_ day of C 5 ~ — • 19?_7 
y^-^*Ct^7 ~^~~ J>< 
MICHAEL BOWEN 
PLAINTIFF 
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TEAK D. JONES, being first duly sworn, deposes upon his oath and states as 
I am the Defendant in the above entitled action and that all statements contained 
in this affidavit are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. 
I assert that the facts surrounding this case are as follows: 
On or about March 6, 1997, acting as agent for Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin, I listed 
the subject property for sale as part of another listing with a St. George property. 
(See Exhibit A) 
Over the course of the next several months, there were two accepted offers on the 
subject property for the sales price of SI 35,000, both of which failed. On both 
offers Plaintiff Kristen Hortin, signed as the seller. 
5. Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin, has authorization granted to her by her Decree of 
Divorce to be the only person authorized to sell the home. Plaintiff, Michael 
Bowen was ordered in the parties Decree of Divorce to execute and deliver all 
documents necessary to effect a property transfer. (See Exhibit B) 
6. The first and original lease option was signed by Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin, in 
December of 1997, which gave a lease period from January of 1998 until July of 
1998, with an option to purchase granted by the seller. (See Exhibit C) Plaintiff, 
Michael Bowen, signed and delivered the original agreement in mid to late 
February. 
7. Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin, was attempting to purchase a new town home in St. 
George, Utah. The builder was holding the town home for her and required the 
sale or lease of the subject property in order for her to qualify for financing. 
8. Said listing contract expired with the failure of the previously mentioned sales. 
However, I offered to purchase the property under a lease with option to purchase 
arrangement. The option price would be approximately equivalent to the amount 
Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin. would have received net after commissions and closing 
costs from the prior mentioned sales. 
9. Thus, Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin, could now complete the financing for the purchase 
of her new town home, and I, having now worked on it for six months, might 
salvage an amount equivalent to a commission upon resale of the property. Also, 
now with the property vacated, some of the needed repairs that had hampered our 
previous marketing efforts could be accomplished. 
10. In about mid November of 1997, it was agreed between Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin, 
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and myself that we would execute the afore mentioned lease option agreement, 
and that I would take immediate possession to begin the needed repairs and 
marketing of the property. Thus, giving me a head start of 1Y2 months prior to any 
payment obligation. 
11. It was also agreed that Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin, would secure the signatures of her 
ex-husband, Michael Bowen, on the lease option agreement. The signature of 
Michael Bowen was not legally necessary, but was for the purpose of insuring his 
cooperation, as he had twice previously tlireatened to stop her in her efforts to sell 
the property. Further, his signature would establish an agreement on the value of 
the subject property as specified in the parties Decree of Divorce, which would 
protect Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin, from being later damaged by an appraisal, done 
after repairs were completed, in higher than the selling price. 
12. As part of the original lease option agreement, there was a proposal to improve 
the property, which I agreed to and attempted to begin by hiring a workman and 
advancing him cash for the necessary materials. 
13. I later learned that Plaintiff, Michael Bowen, the ex-husband of the legal seller, 
Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin, had expelled the repair man that I hired to make 
improvements on the subject property. Having had my workman ran off and 
having not received final signed copies of the agreement back, I moved on to 
other commitments. 
14. Then approximately late February, I finally received back the original agreement 
signed by all parties. I reiterated to Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin, that now that time 
has passed, we would need to extend our agreement and that the monies I had set 
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aside for repairs and payments had been used elsewhere, and I would need to 
remake those arrangements. Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin expressed that she still 
wanted me to go ahead with the property and that she understood additional time 
would be needed. 
15. Thus, May of 1998, was the first time that I had accessability to the property. 
Therefore, in effect by our actions, we had moved forward the lease option to May 
even though it was dated back in December. 
16. I made two months payments in April totaling SI380. I then made another two 
months payments on June 17 totaling SI300. Thus, by our actions, we had begun 
the deal that was originally scheduled to start January in May due to Michael 
Bowen's actions. I was more than willing to abide by the original agreement in 
January when it was signed, but, Plaintiff, Michael Bowen, interfered by expelling 
my repairman, removing my Realtor's sign and lockbox, and not conveying 
cooperation by acceptance until mid to late February. 
17. When I tried to go in and make the improvements the second time as requested by 
Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin, once again the meddling ex-spouse, Michael Bowen, 
stepped in and stated that he was going to keep my money even though he had no 
legal standing either to consent to or to object to the agreement. (See Exhibit B -
The Decree of Divorce) 
18. Once again Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin, stated that she wanted me to follow through 
with the original agreement. Therefore, I started making the rental payments and 
began making the improvements on the property as requested by Plaintiff, Kristen 
Hortin. 
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19. Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin, continued to reaffirm with me on a regular basis, up until 
November of 1998 when she actually closed with me and complied with her intent 
to sell the property to me, as the only authorized person to make that deal. 
20. The delay in closing was due to the financier's inability to get the loan closed 
timely. Plaintiff, Kristen Hortin actually signed the closing documents in 
November. 
21. At the time of the November closing, the lender stated, in order for him to close 
the loan and obtain financing for me, he needed to establish a paper trail of our 
agreement. 
22. It was at that time, not in May of 1998, but rather in November of 1998, that the 
lender presented the second lease document, upon which the Plaintiffs exclusively 
rely. Even though said document is dated in May, it was not signed by me until 
November. 
23. Said document was never negotiated by me, there was never a meeting of the 
minds, we had never come to accord as to what the terms would be. It wras simply 
presented to me, strictly and solely, as a requirement for me to be able to close the 
loan. 
24. Said document was signed at closing, in November of 1998, for the sole purpose 
of leaving a "paper trail" so that the lender could check the box on his lender form 
stating that he had obtained that information. Said document is null and void and 
fraudulent and it was signed for a different purpose than Plaintiffs are now 
alleging. There was no meeting of the minds as it was signed strictly for 
financing purposes. Further, It was never agreed upon as a binding agreement 
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25. Further affiant sayth not. 




SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t h i s ^ T ^ a y of January, 1999. 
NOTARY PUBtlC 
403 Wast 2525 Norm 
Sunsst,UT84015 
'v Commission Expires 
:.7ecsrr-ber12f 2C01 
"^r^ OF UTAH 
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SELECTED PORTIONS OF DIVORCE DECREE 
insurance coverage. Neither parent shall contract for nor incur any obligation for orthodontic 
work or elective surgery for the child, or any type of psychological counseling or evaluation for a 
child without the prior agreement or consent of the other parent in writing. The non-custodial 
parent will have the right in advance to have a say in the selection of doctors and procedures for 
any and all orthodontic, surgery procedures or psychological counseling. 
The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of coverage to the 
other parent upon initial enrollment of the dependent children, and thereafter on or before January 
2 of each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other parent of any change of insurance 
carrier, or benefits within thirty (30) calendar days of the date he first knew or should have known 
of the change 
8. ALIMONY. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the amount of $630,00 per month 
for alimony beginning August 1, 1995 until such time as the Plaintiff remarries, graduates from 
college or acquires full time employment, but not to exceed five years from the date August I, 
1995 or August 1,2000. 
These payments are taxable to the payee and deductible to the payor, 
9 SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS. Plaintiff is awarded those Social Security 
Benefits she is entitled to as a spouse of the Defendant for over ten (10) years. 
10. PERSONAL PROPERTY OF PLAI&TIEE. Plaintiff is awarded those items of 
personal property currently in her possession, together with ber personal belongings and effects. 
11 PERSONAL PROPERTY OF DEFENDANT. Defendant is awarded those items 
of personal property currently in his possession, together with his personal belongings and effects. 
12. REAL PROPERTY. Plaintiffis awarded possession of the residential home and 
DCV/GN V 9CWEN 
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real property located at 2614 North 700 East, North Ogden, Utah, 84414 A legal description of 
r 
the property is attached as Exhibit A. 0 3 f*^\ ^ *
 r , , 'A t 
The home has an approximate appraised value of $135,000. w, and a mortgage bidancc of 
$65,000.00. The parties agree that the Defendant shall maintain an interest in the home until such 
time as the home is sold or alimony ceases as set forth in Paragraph 13 above. At such lime the 
home will be valued by the parties, by appraisal or otherwise as agreed. Defendant shall be 
awarded a non-interest bearing lien in the sum equal to one-half the equity in the home at the rime 
of appraisal which shaU be paid to the defendant upon the occurrence of any one of the following 
conditions: 
(a) Plaintiffs remarriage; 
(b) Plaintiffs death; 
(c) Sale of the home; 
(d) Six (6) months after the eighteenth birthday of the youngest child of the 
parties, or July 10,2008; 
(e) If the Plaintiff shall co-habitat with a member of the opposite sex; or 
(f) Cessation of the use of the home as the primary residence. 
13. DEBTS OF PLAINTIFF. The plaintiff shall assume and discharge the following 
debts: Balance of £700.00 due Weber State Credit Union on the station wagon, Key Bank, Home 
Equity Loan, balance 51,000.00; Bank One, Home Equity, balance $350.00; Pete Christensen, 
DDS, dentist bill, balance $210.00; those debts incurred since the parties' separation of July 15, 
1995, and to indemnify, defend and hold the defendant harmless therefrom. 
Plaintiff shall also assume responsibility for the mortgage loan payment on the marital 
BCW5N v. scwe* 
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residence and acknowledges and agrees that alimony, in part, received pursuant to the Stipulation 
and Property Settlement Agreement and this Decree shall be used for making timely mortgage 
payments. 
14. DEBTS OF DEFENDANT. The defendant shall assume and discharge the 
following debts, those debts he has incurred since the parties' separation of July 15, 1995, and to 
indemnify, defend and hold the plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
15 NQTTCE OF DEBTS The parties shall provide a certified copy of the Final 
Decree of Divorce to aU creditors of the parties pursuant to the Utah Code .Ann §§ 30-3-5(l)(c) 
and 15-4-6 5, and do aay follow-up necessary to effectuate these statutes. With respect to either 
party who is not ordered to make payments under U.C.A §§ 30-3-5 and 30-4-3 on the joint 
obligations, no negative credit report under U C A § 7QC-7-107 and no report of the debtor's 
repayment practices or credit history under Chapter 14, Tftle 7, Credit information Exchange, 
may be made regarding the joint obligation after the creditor is served notice of the Couit's order 
as required under U C.A. § 15-4-6 5(2), unless the creditor has made a demand on the joint 
obligor not ordered to pay the debt for payment because of the failure to make payments by the 
joint obligor ordered to make the payments 
16 COBRA. The defendant shall assist the plaintiff in obtaining medical benefits for 
the plaintiff through defendant's place of employment for a divorced spouse, as provided by Title 
X of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Art (COBRA) 1985 The plaintiff is 
responsible for payment of the insurance premiums for such coverage. All expenses not covered 
by insurance shall be the sole responsibility of the plaintiff for payment. The defendant is further 
required to make available to plaintiff all necessary forms and documents to effectuate the same 
cfc^se or ^ vc»c£ 
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for submission to the appropriate agencies. 
17. LIFE INSURANCE. The defendant shall maintain a life insurance policy listing 
the minor children as beneficiaries, in an amount sufficient to cover child support in the event of 
the defendant's death, as long as it is available through his place of employment, with the 
provision that should the defendant remarry and have additional children, those children can be 
listed as co-beneficiaries in equal amounts. 
18. TAX RETURN. The plaintiff and defendant shall file a joint tax return for the tax 
year 1995. 
19. INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONS. Defendant is awarded the minor children for 
income tax deduction purposes so long as he is paying child support. However, the defendant can 
only claim the minor children for income tax deduction purposes if he is current in his child 
support payments for the year in which he is claiming the deductions. The plaintiff will waive her 
rights therein if all provisions are met, and sign the necessary annual waiver with the Internal 
Revenue Service, Form 8332. 
M such time as plaintiff becomes gainfully employed, the parties agree that the tax 
deduaions shall be split between the parties with defendant claiming the oldest and youngest child 
and plaintiff claiming the middle child as dependents. 
If the physical custody of one or more of the children changes, the parties agree to revisit 
the issues of child support and tax deductions. 
20. TAXES. Each of the parties is responsible for and liable for any tax implications 
for those properties acquired through this Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement. 
21. TRANSFER OF PROPERTY. Each party or their heirs or assigns shall 
OeCREE Cf CXYCKCE 
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immediately deliver all personal property awarded to the other party in their possesion, and 
execute and deliver all documents and titles necessary to effect a property transfer as ordered in 
the Decree of Divorce to be entered herein. 
22. PLAINTTFFS MAIDEN NAME. Plaintiffs maiden name of Hortin shall be 
restored to her upon entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
23 ATTORNEYS FEES Defendant shall pay attorney's fees in the total amount of 
5600.00, and all costs incurred for this action. 
DATED this / / d a y of f/sfr6*f , 199<5 
DISTRICT C t f U ^ M ^ E 
Approved As to Form: 
MICHAEL W. BOWEN 
Defendant 
DECRK OF DJVC*!CS 
8CWENY BC*v£N 
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TITLE INSURANCE AGENCY INC. 
ESCROW SETTLEMENT STATEMENT 
SELLER'S COPY 
FILE NO 2-12792A 
ESCROW NO 2-12792A 
DATED 11/12/98 
PRORATED TO 11/13/98 
BUYER DIANA HARRISON 
SELLER MICHAEL W BOWEN AND KRISTEN H BOWEN 
BROKER 
PROPERTY ADDRESS 2614 NORTH 700 EAST, OGDEN, UT 84414 
SELLERS MAILING ADDRESS , OGDEN, UT 
TYPE OF TRANSACTION 
PURCHASE PRICE $ 125 500 00 
OPTION PA/MENT $ 3 240 00 
LA^E FEES $ 100 00 
TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE AND CREDITS DUE SELLER $ 128,840 00 
LESS CREDITS TO BUYER 
TAXES ASSUMED 01/01/98 TO 11/13/98 Q$ 1,024 12 $ 886 64 
TITLE INSURANCE PAID BY BUYER $ 696 00 
TOTAL CREDITS TO BUYERS . $ 1,5 82 64 
NET EQUITY BEFORE EXPENSES $ 127,2 57 36 
EXPENSES OF THE SELLER 
PAYOFF LOAN TO COUNTRYWIDE $ 61,016 95 
PAYOFF 2nd LOAN TO ADAMS $ 20,205 2$ 
CLOSING FEE TO AV^S & ARCHIBALD TITLE INS AGENC/ TtfC$ 95 00 
TOTAL EXPENSES FOR SELLER ... . $ 81 31/ 24 
NET DUE TO SELLER . . $ 45,940 12 
THE UNDERSIGNED BT THE S10WJW0 OF THIS DOCUHEVT HERESY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF A COPT OF THE SAME AND A G U E TO 
IE L U 8 L E FOR AND MOID TITLE COMPANT HARMLESS M O M AXY /OOfTIOVAL CHARGES RELATING TO TKE A80VE REFERENCED PROPERTY 
HOT CiISCLOSED IN THIS STATEMENT BY AMY LlfNHOLDE* 3E H HORTGAGE PATO'FS OR ASSUMPTION FIGURES TAXES AMD/OR 
OTHER SIMILAR ASSESSMENTS 
* QRI.I.FP ^  v SELLER 3 
NORTH OGDEH, UT 
WARRANTY DEED 
GRAJJTORS 
2 - 1 2 7 9 2 A 
MICHAEL W. BOWiEN AND KRISTEN H. BOWEN, 
of OCDEN, Coun ty of WEBER, S t a t e of UT, 
h e r e b y CONVEYS ANTj WARRANTS TO 
DIANA HARRISON 
GRANTEE 
of , NORTH OGDEN, UT 
for the cum of Ten dollars and other good ^nd valuable cortsidcra:ion. 
The following tract of land in WEBER County, State of Utah, to-vit-
18-01.1-0006 
THE NORTH 8S FEET OF LOT 3. BLOCK 14, FLAT A. NORTH OGDEN SURVEY 
WEBER COUNTY. UTAH 
Subject to easements restrictions and rights of ^ay 
appearing of record or enforceable in law and equity and 1998 
taxes and thereafter. 
WITNESS the hands of said Grantors this 12th day of November, 1998 
~^^^^SAUAK^_ 
MICHAEL W. BOW5N 
KRISTEN H. BOWEN 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:SS 
COUNTY OF WEBER > 
ON THE 12th DAY OF NOVEMBER . A D 1998. PERSONALLY 
APPEARED BEF0R5 ME' MICHAEL W. BOWEN AND KRISTEN H. BOWEN, 
THE SIGNER(S) OP THE 
WITHIN INSTRUMENT, VfliO DULY ACKNOWLEDGED TO *Z THAT TH£Y_ 
EXECUTED THE SAME. 




837 SOUTH 900 EAST 
SI OfOI IOE. UTU4790 
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April 9, 1999 
HONORABLE PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN PRESIDING 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: All right. This is in the matter 
of Bowen versus Jones, number 980908407. It's the 
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Just to let you 
know I had, I was gone the last part, of last week and we 
had checked to see if there was anything on the calendar 
and they said there wasn't. So I didn't get this file to 
review until just this morning and I had other matters. I 
have, you know, given it a cursory review. I understand 
the basic issues. I'm not really sure I understand the 
whole factual scenario. That's the only thing I'm a 
little, not totally clear about. Apparently, it's fairly 
complicated about what happened when. It was a fairly 
complicated set of facts forth in the memorandum in 
opposition. And I'd just say, I haven't really digested 
that completely. I understand there was a lease and option 
to purchase. There may have been more than one. The 
contention is that it expired or something and I guess that 
the other contention is that it was not an arm's length 














lease it was an 
1 
1 MR. BARON: Right. The first lease, I don't 
2 think there is any dispute that all the parties agreed on 
3 that. The second lease, the defendant is alleging anyway, 
4 that he only signed that later on as for a lender or 
5 something. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. The first lease also had an 
7 option to purchase? 
8 MR. BARON: Yes. 
9 THE COURT: And that was signed by the defendant? 
10 MR. BARON: Yes. 
11 THE COURT: And when did that expire? 
12 MR. BARON: I believe that was in July of last 
13 year. 
14 THE COURT: July of ^98? 
15 MR. BARON: Right. It expired earlier than the 
16 second option that he is saying that -
17 THE COURT: And it's your contention that the 
18 option was never perfected? 
19 MR. BARON: Well, it was never exercised. 
20 THE COURT: Never exercised? 
21 MR. BARON: Yes. Your Honor, I do have one case 
22 that I found after I submitted my last reply. I have given 
23 counsel a copy of it. If I may approach the bench, I do 
24 have a copy for the Court. 
25 I THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
2 
1 Having said that then, I'll let you, you know, 
2 present what you have to present but -
3 MR. BARON: Thank you, your Honor. It is rather 
4 a complex situation. What we had was a home here in Ogden 
5 that been owned by a husband and wife who then divorced. 
6 The husband and wife did sign an option agreement with the 
7 defendant in about, I believe it was December of x97, an 
8 option with, a lease with an option is what it was. In 
9 1998, I was made aware of the situation, reviewed that, was 
10 not really happy with how clear it was worded and so I 
11 redid it and gave it to the parties and that was signed by 
12 all the parties although the defendant is now saying that 
13 that wasn't signed by him until later and he claims it was 
14 just an accommodation but it was a lease and it was an 
15 option. The first option did expire I believe in July of 
16 last year, the second one the end of August. 
17 It's undisputed in the facts that the defendant 
18 did nothing to exercise his option on either lease prior to 
19 the expiration. It's also undisputed on the facts that the 
20 defendant has not paid all the money that is due under the 
21 lease. That as a matter of fact he has been living in that 
22 residence for approximately the last six or eight months 
23 rent free and not having made any lease payments. 
24 Following the expiration of the option, the 
25 J defendant continued to live there for some period of time 
3 
1 and about October or November of last year he attempted to 
2 exercise his option by finding a buyer and essentially 
3 wanted to have the buyer purchase it and then use some of 
4 that money to pay his last or his behind lease payments. 
5 It's rather curious because at the same time that he was 
6 doing this he actually assigned his option to a third party 
7 and the third party was supposed to go ahead and sell the 
8 premises and I suppose pay the lease payments. But 
9 there's, in the record, a copy of that assignment which is 
10 interesting because the defendant now appears he is living 
11 in the home and yet he's assigned any interest he has in 
12 the lease and option. Of course, the lease and the option 
13 had expired months previous. 
14 THE COURT: When was that assignment attempted to 
15 be made? 
16 MR. BARON: The assignment was later. It was at 
17 the same time he attempted to exercise the option in around 
18 November of last year. And there is a copy in the file of 
19 the assignment. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. There probably is and I just 
21 didn't have all the bullets in line so. 
22 I MR. MCKAY: November, what was that date? 
23 I MR. BARON: November llrh. Okay. And so the 
24 defendant appears here living in the premise having 
25 assigned his right to the option and lease, his main 
1 contention, I believe, is that he tried to exercise the 
2 option that one of the two persons whose name appears on 
3 the title, Kristen Hortin, he alleges assigned, signed some 
4 document having to do with the sale of the property. I 
5 have never seen a copy of that document. I don't know of 
6 any allegation that there was ever anything signed 
7 extending the option. The case that I presented to the 
8 Court is Coombs versus—and I'm not sure how to pronounce 
9 this--Ozmiun, covers a couple of thiags that I think are at 
10 least relevant to this case. One is that it makes clear 
11 that options are covered by the statute of frauds. Any 
12 extension of that option would have had to be in writing 
13 signed by the parties. We have nothing Like that. There 
14 is not even any allegation that there ever was anything 
15 like that. And so there could not have been an extension 
16 to the option. 
17 The second thing that covers, this case was an 
18 interesting factual case and somewhat similar to what we 
19 have here. It involved a husband and wife that had given 
20 an option to a third party, it came time for the option to 
21 expire and one of the, I can't remember if it was the 
22 husband or wife, but one of them signed actually an 
23 extension and said I'm going to give you an extension on 
24 the option. The other, once again it was the husband or 
25 J wife, did not sign the extension agreement. The Court held 
5 
1 that the assignment was not valid and that both parties did 
2 not sign it. And here we have an ex-husband and wife and 
3 neither party signed an extension. Clearly subject to the 
4 statutes of frauds but even if Kristen Hortin had signed an 
5 extension, that doesn't extend the option in that the 
6 parties, all the parties to the option of the lease did not 
7 sign. 
8 So, your Honor, my clients are very frustrated. 
9 They've had this man living in the home rent free for all 
10 this time and they would like the Court to issue summary 
11 judgment, order him out of the home. If the Court sees an 
12 issue on past rent, we've alleged that. We've covered it 
13 in our affidavit. Certainly we could handle that at a 
14 later hearing. We don't think there is any issue with 
15 regard to that and it can be determined under the affidavit 
16 and the facts alleged. So we would ask that we be granted 
17 summary judgment, that we have an Order of the Sheriff to 
18 move the defendant from the premises. Thank you. 
19 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
2 0 MR. MCKAY: Thank you, your Honor. Good morning. 
21 THE COURT: Good morning. 
22 MR. MCKAY: I think it's important that the Court 
23 understand all of the facts here. Counsel has made some 
24 representations and some of that is true, but I guess to 



























everything that has happened. This is a husband and wife, 
both of them are the plaintiffs. Divorced, I don't know 
when but prior to this time and the wife was given all the 
interest in the marital property subject to a lien by the 
husband for equity. So she, therefore, had all of the 
right to sell the property. My client is a real estate 
agent. He, I don't know if he's a broker or an agent, but 
anyway, he does real estate work and he had arranged for 
this woman to receive a condo to buy, purchase a 
condominium in St. George. Okay, one of the plaintiffs. I 
think her name is Kristen Hortin. And when, as part of 
this deal she needed to sell her home. The home that is 
this particular home that my client is now living there. 
So, he was accommodating her. To make this deal work in 
St. George, he had to help her sell her home here and so 
the home was listed and had two potential purchasers. Both 
of those deals fell through because the property wasn't 
quite up to standard to sell. So, my client said fine, I 
will buy the property or I'll rent the property and buy it 
and I'll fix it up and then we'll sell it and we'll go 
ahead and finish all these deals including your one in St. 
George. And that's the December agreement 
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1 He came in and basically ran my client's repair person off. 
2 The person that he had hired to go in and fix the place up 
3 so that they could get it ready to sell. So, my client 
4 goes to Kristen Hortin and says, Hey, you know, are you 
5 going to have your ex do this or are you going to have me 
6 do this because we're both not going to do it. It just 
7 isn't going to work that way. You know, if I'm going to do 
8 it, fine. I'll do it. If he's going to do it. I'll just 
9 back away. I've got other things to do. 
10 So, after a month or two finally she decides 
11 yeah, no, I definitely want you to go ahead and do it and 
12 I'll get him out of it. So, at that point my client says 
13 okay, this is definitely a go. Yes, it's a go. So, they 
14 basically begin the document rather than in December they 
15 started in the spring time. I believe it was about March, 
16 April or May. 
17 Help me, Teak. 
18 It was April or May. So, my client at that time 
19 makes two rental payments which would carry him through 
20 until an August date which, and then he moves in and he 
21 starts to really try to get this place up to speed. He 
22 contacts a potential buyer. He works everything out and 
23 he's in constant contact with Kristen. Okay, not with Mr. 
24 Bowen, the meddling spouse. He's in constant contact with 
25 the person that he believes to be the only person with 
1 authority to sell this house. This constant contact is 
2 going up through November 11. Okay? He has financing 
3 arranged. 
4 THE COURT: Now what was this arrangement that, I 
5 J guess, we've got the written option from December. Did — 
MR. MCKAY: Right. And it is supposed to expire 
in August is my understanding. The first agreement, okay. 
And then he's got financing arranged and everything is a go 
9 I and they're scheduled to close and the buyer, the new buyer 
10 comes in the the new buyer signs all the closing document. 
11 Kristen Hortin -
12 THE COURT: And when was that again? 
13 MR. MCKAY: November 11th, I believe. 
14 THE COURT: Okay, this is in November. 
15 MR. MCKAY: Yes, it was attached, counsel said he 
16 didn't get a copy of it. We attached it as an exhibit. 
17 THE COURT: Yeah, I'm sure that it's in here. I 
18 just want to make sure I'm following you. 
19 MR. MCKAY: If there is something afterwards, you 
20 can tell me. 
21 And Kristen Hortin, one of the plaintiffs, 
22 actually comes in at that date and signs all the closing 
23 documents. 
24 THE COURT: For the sale to this new buyer. 
25 I MR. MCKAY: Right, right. And as part of the 
9 
1 financing, and this is where all of this gets muddled. 
2 Okay. To that point everybody is moving along, even the 
3 ex-spouse, Mr. Bowen, is getting involved. And he says is 
4 it still going to close, is it still going to close, is it 
5 still going to close? Okay. He's following everything 
6 along. Doesn't object once. Everything is going smoothly. 
7 Then at that point in order to close and get all the 
8 financing worked out, the title, is he a title guy or is he 
9 a finance guy? 
10 MR. JONES: A finance. 
11 MR. MCKAY: The finance guy says we need to make 
12 a paper trail so this thing is going to work on the 
13 financing. At that point, clear in November, is when my 
14 client is presented with this second lease option. Okay. 
15 The second lease option actually expired by its terms two 
16 months prior to the date that he even signed it. So 
17 there's a big question as to meeting of the minds and what 
18 that purpose of that document was. 
19 Now, counsel wants the Court to rely solely on 
20 the face of that document but clearly any document signed 
21 and any document that has expired two months prior to the 
22 date of the signing and I don't think they're disputing 
23 that he signed it that date, has got to be fraudulent on 
24 its face and null and void. Anyway, so in order to leave a 
25 I paper trail he signs this second document so that he can 
10 
1 get financing and close, you know, within a week. As part 
2 of that same agreement, as part of the closing on the 
3 document and as part of the a, everything that needs to 
4 happen so the financing can be completed. 
5 THE COURT: Financing for this third person 
6 that's buying it? 
7 MR. MCKAY: Right. My client has to assign his 
8 right because of his financial situation, he has to assign 
9 his right to a third person. This third person is actually 
10 his wife, okay? That's the assignment that counsel is 
11 talking about. He assigns it to her because she is in a 
12 better financial condition to complete the financing. I 
13 mean he is working extremely hard to make this deal work 
14 for all the parties. And everybody is in agreement with it 
15 except for Mr. Bowen. Everybody has signed it except for 
16 Mr. Bowen. And at that point on the closing, the finance 
17 person comes in and says, Mr. Bowen, you need to sign these 
18 papers, okay, because he has some lien interest and he's 
19 going to be, he has to agree to the amount that he is to 
20 receive out of the equity. He doesn't sign. Okay. 
21 That's, that's the point that he gets together with his 
22 attorney or with the lender, the financier and they 
23 basically conspire and say, Hey, we can cut him out of this 
24 deal altogether. We know who the buyer is. I haven't 
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THE COURT: What, they wanted to cut him out of 
his sales commission? 
MR. MCKAY: Yeah. Exactly. My client and this 
third party is actually his wife. She's, you know, and 
they did that strictly because he needed the clean credit 
to do the financing. We feel like the whole thing is a 
scam basically to cheat him out of a sales commission. And 
we wanted to make sure we were clear here before we go and 
file all of our, but we believe there have been several 
violations of law and we intend to pursue those. Number 
one, against Mr. Bowen for meddling and we indicated that 
in our documents, for interfering with business interests 
when he had no right to do so. And number two, against 
this lender who we believe has also violated the law. 
But as far as a summary judgment motion or 
anything in that vane we just feel it would be 

























that we haven't had time today to explain to the Court and 
that we would put on by testimony. 
And, by the way, my client is here and is 
prepared to testify if this Court wishes him to do so to 
clarify anything or just so that we can have something on 
the record under sworn. 
THE COURT: Let me just make sure I understand. 
So there was lease with option to purchase signed in 
December of ^97. 
MR. MCKAY: Yes. 
THE COURT: Expired probably in July or August. 
MR. MCKAY: Right. And it didn't even begin, I 
guess it was on paper but the terms of it didn't start 
until several months after the time that they were supposed 
to start. 
THE COURT: But, but did it expire in August? 
MR. MCKAY: Yes. But I guess one of the points 
that's important for the Court to understand is had he had 
from December until July or Augus 
for sale, then he could have done 
of time. But because Mr. 
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13 
1 could have everything completed and finish the sale. 
2 THE COURT: But from August on, it is your 
3 contention that there was no actual written lease with 
4 option to purchase. Is that — 
5 MR. MCKAY: Well, and that, thank you, your 
6 Honor, for reminding me about the statute of frauds. What 
7 I want to know or want the Court to a, I guess our defense 
8 to the statute of frauds argument that counsel made is that 
9 there is case law. I didn't bring the cases today because 
10 I didn't know that counsel was going to present these 
11 arguments today. But there is case law that allows an 
12 exception to the statute of frauds if there are enough, and 
13 it can be notes, it can be scratches on paper, it can be 
14 documents. If there are enough of those to establish the 
15 terms of an extension, then the extension would apply. 
16 We're saying that because Kristen Hortin actually signed 
17 closing documents and although, even though she verbally 
18 agreed to everything up until that point and actually by 
19 her actions confirmed the extension period and even signed 
20 closing documents, that those written document would create 
21 the extension that would be the exception to the statute of 
22 fraud. 
23 MR. JONES: You have the actual closing date was 
24 vague because of a seven and a half month deal was now cut 
25 I to a three month deal. 
14 
1 MR. MCKAY: Right, that explains it. 
2 MR. JONES: And (inaudible) if I can't get it 
3 done then and there's verbal — 
4 THE COURT: Well, let me just hear from him. And 
5 I understand you may want to talk with him but it's not 
6 going to help me to have you — 
7 MR. MCKAY: Right. 
8 THE COURT: I just need it presented to me. 
9 MR. JONES: (Inaudible) responsible for those 
10 closing — 
11 MR. MCKAY: And there are other things. It's not 
12 just that, you know, he ran this person off. There are a 
13 lot of o~her problems that the plaintiff has created here. 
14 You know, even getting the police involved with meddling 
15 with the property and such. We feel like, you know, he's 
16 still trying to be the controlling spouse even though there 
17 is a divorce. The decree of divorce gives her all rights 
18 to sell 1:he property and do whatever. All he gets is 
19 whatever his portion of the equity is. And that is really 
20 is the problem here. That's why we're in Court today id 
21 because he has done that. We would ask this Court to deny 
22 that and allow us to finalize. We'll be asking the Court 
23 in the near future to allow, to actually hold him as the or 
24 his assignee as the true buyer. Maybe there's a third 
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r is it a rent owing 
time while he's 
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November, 
client was paid, he 
double payments. 
they proffered the 
refused and then they brought 
this action for eviction. So the money was proffered but 
they refused it. And then they or he did, I should say, 
out of greed or for whatever other reason controlling an 
ex-spouse has meddled in this whole thing. 
THE COURT: Is there some reason no lease with 
option to buy was entered into when the other one expired--
MR. MCKAY: I think what happened is and maybe 
itfs because of all the verbal representations. Everything 
was going perfectly fine and, you know, the woman, Kristen, 
was basically saying, yeah, I know my ex-spouse meddled and 
so you couldn't do it and sof yeah, we're going to go 
ahead. And everything was moving along fine and everything 
is going fine until, you know, even up until the signing of 
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there are some necessary third parties that need 
but we're asking the Court to deny their request. 
you. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you want to 
1
 that then? 
to be here 
Thank 
respond to 
MR. BARON: Your Honor, frankly, as I mentioned 
in my reply a lot of what the defendant brings up is just 
plain malarkey. Mr. Bowen never did interfere with 
anything but even if you consider all that, it really has 
nothing to do with the essential facts of this case. As 
counsel was talking, I turned through my file, I see the 
copy of the option and the lease signed in December. Even 
if we completely ignore the one that I prepared in May, if 
we throw out that one, it expired July lzZ of 1998. There 
is no allegation that he exercised the option. There is no 
allegation that he prepared any type of an extension on 
that option. It expired. The accompanying lease expired 
July 1st of 1998. The defendant has paid no rent since 
that time and has been living in the property. 
THE COURT: What about her actions at the time of 
the closing in terms of signing off? Is that inconsistent 
with the contention that there was no interest in the 
property? 
MR. BARON: I think, your Honor, I think what had 
happened is the defendant did continue to live there and 
17 
1 there was an attempt by the defendant to obtain both the 
2 parties agreement to sell the property to a third person. 
3 And once again he assigned any interest in the lease and 
4 option prior to that time. And I have seen no 
5 J documentation on this. They're alleging that Kristen 
signed some things but even if she did, all that would mean 
is that he was trying to get her to sell the property and 
she at least signed some initial document to ready it for 
9 I sale. I don't know, that may have happened, but the sale 
10 fell through. Clearly the option was long gone at that 
11 point. 
12 THE COURT: Why did the sale fall through? 
13 Because Mr. Bowen's— 
14 MR. BARON: The sale fell through, your Honor, 
15 because the property was worth some $30-40,000 more than 
16 what the option purchase price was and that's what they 
17 wanted to pay Kristen and Michael was the option amount. 
18 The property had increased in value and was worth 
19 substantially more and they had no desire to sell it to 
20 anybody. 
21 THE COURT: So Kristen Hortin signed off on it 
22 though. 
23 MR. BARON: I don't know. 
24 MR. MCKAY: Yes. 
25 J MR. BARON: We've heard allegations to that. 
18 
1 THE COURT: And Mr. Bowen needed to sign because 
2 he was a lien holder of some kind. 
3 MR. BARON: Well, and that's another one of 
4 those. It's an unusual divorce decree. Counsel's provided 
5 a copy to the Court. But what it says is that the parties 
6 would be divorced. That Mr. Bowen would "retain an 
7 interest in the property". The equity was not determined 
8 at the time of the divorce as is normal but was to be 
9 determined later and there was several time periods at 
10 which that would be determined. One of which would be the 
11 sale of property or they would go out and have an appraisal 
12 but he was still on the title all this time without any 
13 kind of a lien. He was just a record owner of the property 
14 and so clearly his signature would be required on any sale 
15 of the property. And he didn't sign anything. 
16 And once again, under the statute of frauds and 
17 under that case that I submitted they both would have had 
18 to sign to be able to consummate the sale. And once again, 
19 Mr. Jones has no interest today as he stands before you in 
20 this property. He assigned it. He says it's his wife. If 
21 we read the assignment that the Court has a copy of, let me 
22 turn to it. It's a Dianna Marie Harrison. 
23 MR. MCKAY: That's his wife. 
24 MR. BARON: Why she has a different last name, I 
25 J don't know. But that's who he's assigned it to, she is not 
19 
1 living there. Mr. Jones is living there. I don't know who 
2 or where she is but clearly she's not involved in this 
3 matter. We just want Mr. Jones out of the house. She 
4 received an assignment of what was left of the option to 
5 J purchase which is frankly nothing but Mr. Jones has no 
interest in that property at this point. 
THE COURT: Well, did he do any work on the 
property to upgrade it? 
9 I MR. BARON: He alleges that he did. My client 
10 has gone by and looked and he said he can't see that he's 
11 done much of anything to the property. But once again 
12 under the case law if a tenant does some work on the 
13 property or a person who's got an option and they don't 
14 exercise that option or if they don't make their lease 
15 payments, hey, they take the risk of losing whatever 
16 they've put into the property. And that's what happened in 
17 this case. If he has, in fact, like I say my client has 
18 gone by and has witnessed or looked for any improvements 
19 and informs me, anyway, that he can't really see that was 
20 alleged to be done was done. So -
21 THE COURT: At least they're claiming they have 
22 and that's -
23 MR. BARON 
24 THE COURT 
25 MR. BARON 
They're claiming they have -
- (over talking) -
- but I think the answer to that is 
20 
1 that if he had it should have exercised his option and he 
2 would have got the benefit of that or he should have made 
3 his lease payments. It's, yeah, it's undisputed. He 
4 hasn't made his lease payments. It's undisputed he didn't 
5 extent the option. The only thing that he can try and rely 
6 on is that some time months later one of the owners of the 
7 property may have signed some documents indicating a 
8 willingness to sell at that point but they both didn't 
9 sign. And that certainly doesn't revive the option. 
10 That's a separate matter. The option had already expired. 
11 She's free to sell or not to sell at that point. She 
12 changed her mind and decided not to sell. 
13 I would point out to the Court that under the 
14 statutes in Utah and the case law on a motion for summary 
15 judgment, you review the affidavits to see if there is 
16 sufficient undisputed facts to award a judgment and I think 
17 that under the affidavit it's clearly there are. Counsel 
18 has mentioned a lot of matters that are not in the 
19 affidavit some of which I've heard for the first time 
20 today. But certainly that's not something that the Court 
21 should be considering at this time. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. I need to go back and look at 
23 the scenario again and if you have something to submit on 
24 the statute of frauds argument which were just raised, I'd 



























under advisement. It's not as -
MR. MCKAY: May I respond briefly? 
THE COURT: Well, ordinarily he gets the last 
word but frankly if it's going to help me I just as soon 
hear it all so -
MR. MCKAY: She did sign off on the property and 
all of that should be attached as an exhibit and if the 
Court doesn't have the exhibit we will--and we argued all 
these points in our memorandum. We attached documents. I 
don't know if counsel hasn't received any or if he just 
hasn't read it. 
THE COURT: Who was the title holder? 
MR. MCKAY: She was. 
THE COURT: Did he have, this Mr. Bowen, did he 
have any other than his -
MR. MCKAY: The decree of divorce granted the 
property to her. 
MR. BARON: His name was still on the deed. 
MR. MCKAY: Well, yeah, she was going to sell 












And refinancing, but -
At any rate he was still on the 
Apparently so. But I think the main 
22 
1 reason why he had to sign off is to protect her so that he 
2 couldn't claim that, you know, she sold the property for 
3 less that it was worth or, you know, for some other reason. 
4 It was to protect her so that he couldn't later come back 
5 and try to get more. I mean this is a divorce after all. 
6 Try to get more money out of the deal and I'm sure the 
7 Court has seen that happen more than once. 
8 THE COURT: But I guess, let me just, if he had 
9 an interest though in the amount of the sale, if it 
10 determines how much equity he is getting, I don't know that 
11 I've got that in here or not. I don't know if I have 
12 enough to make it -
13 MR. MCKAY: Could I help you with the decree? 
14 THE COURT: No, I just want to hear from -
15 MR. MCKAY: We attached a copy of the decree. I 
16 guess the Court could read that. Hopefully that will 
17 clarify that. I haven't seen any liens or anything else. 
18 It just grants him an interest in it. And I haven't even 
19 seen title so I don't know if that's even the case and I 
20 don't know that anybody has presented that. 
21 We also think, feel that the Court should know 
22 that, you know, and they've admitted to the increase in the 
23 value, we say that that's largely due to what my client has 
24 done to improve the value of the property. 
25 J THE COURT: Okay. Let me just get at exactly 
23 
1 what the defense theory on how this option though was 
2 revived in some way. You're saying that there is some 
3 writing by her at the closing that would indicate that 
4 there was at least an extension? 
5 MR. MCKAY: Exactly. 
6 MR. BARON: Your Honor, I've looked in my file. 
7 I can't find the document anywhere. 
8 MR. MCKAY: I've got a copy of it and I'm certain 
9 that we attached that as an exhibit but if not, we can 
10 provide that to everyone. We have that she actually signed 
11 the transfer documents. We do have the documents, it was 
12 like a (inaudible) or something. 
13 • Did you keep that? 
14 (Inaudible) 
15 MR. MCKAY: Apparently, it's in the evidence file 
16 at my office. I didn't bring the whole thing today. I can 
17 provide that to, a copy to counsel and the Court. 
18 THE COURT: Yeah, if there's some writing because 
19 apparent, I mean, there is a problem apparently with the 
20 statute of frauds if there isn't some kind of evidence of a 
21 writing other than fraud. And you're not saying there was 
22 fraud in the, in the -
23 MR. BARON 
24 THE COURT 
25 MR. BARON 
I'm saying that the whole signing -
- December x97 document? 



























December, no. But December -
THE COURT: But that's the one he's relying to -
MR. MCKAY: No, they actually in their original 
complaint never even mentioned that. They only mentioned 
the second document. I was the one that brought up the 
first document in my response. 
THE COURT: Right. But that's the one that he's 
relying on. Because he's not saying there was any -
MR. BARON: On today, is that right. You were 
relying on the first one or the second one? 
MR. MCKAY: It doesn't matter to me. Either or 
both of them. 
THE COURT: He's not relying on either one of 
them. He's saying there wasn't an option. So, I'm -
MR. BARON: I'm saying either option expired. 
THE COURT: I guess it's the defense's position 
that there was, that there was some kind of an extension of 
an option which gave him some kind of rights on this 
property. 
MR. MCKAY: Exactly. 
THE COURT: 
claiming that the one 
transaction, then he's 
"91. 
got 
That expired, in 
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right. I guess I'm trying to find out what right he's 
claiming, on what basis he's claiming his right to the 
option. You know, there is no written option at that 
point. The question is was there, was there some kind of 
extension and, if so, what supports that contention. If 
there is some document that supports it. 
MR. MCKAY: Yeah, we'll present that to the 
Court. We do have those documents and we will present 
them. I thought they were attached as an exhibit. 
THE COURT: Okay, well, -
MR. MCKAY: But maybe they too (inaudible) to 
provide that. 
THE COURT: - maybe you can present that with 
your statute of frauds. 
MR. MCKAY: You know, and as far as the 
assignment goes, and I don't know how counsel can claim 
that he assigned something that counsel claims he didn't 
own. I mean counsel claims he didn't own anything so how 
can he assign anything? You know, I don't know how he can 
claim it both ways. Yeah, he owned it so he could assign 









Okay. I assume the assignment 
They are. 



























didn't have any right to then it doesn't matter, it 
doesn't, it doesn't mean that their contention is invalid 
it just means that he didn't have right to make any 
assignment. 
MR. BARON: No, I guess it just goes to -
THE COURT: She wanted to sell it to the wife, 
his wife, that's I guess between her and the wife, his 
wife. Whether he has a claim in it somehow. I guess I'm 
just trying to establish what his interest is in the 
property and it needs to be established by some kind of 
writing apparently and -
MR. MCKAY: What, how, I guess I need to get a 
feel from the Court whether they want us, whether your 
Honor would like us to present some evidence regarding the 
other issue about the unclean hands doctrine. It seems 
like we almost have to have an evidentiary hearing just on 
that. I mean if the parties enter into an agreement and 
one of the parties, the spouse in this case, the husband, 
meddles and makes it impossible for him to comply with the 
terms of the agreement by chasing off his workers and 
trying to do the 
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never, 
apparently never intended to purchase the property. 
MR. MCKAY: No, he did have a buyer, he did 
intend to purchase it but he had some personal 
circumstances that required him to actually move. You 
know, he and his wife had a disagreement, they were 
legally, I guess not legally, but they were separated 
during all of the fiasco. That also took place and so he 
needed a place to live on a temporary basis. So, that's 
part that this Court hasn't heard yet and I don't think 
anyone is alleging, I'm not sure that it's, you know, 
except that the Court felt that it was important to 
address. That's why we haven't -
THE COURT: Why didn't he, why didn't he exercise 
his option to purchase it then? 
MR. MCKAY: Because he still felt like, I mean, 
it was tied to two or three other deals and she had 
28 
1 continued to say, yeah, it's going to go, it's going to go, 
2 it's going to go, and then he needed this additional time 
3 to complete the financing. And he thought, right, he 
4 probably should have gotten written, signed agreement. 
5 MR. JONES: I have her understanding when we 
6 preceded to closing that she signed,. I didn't need any 
7 interim documents. I had the closing documents at this 
8 point, both the lease and options are dead in view points 
9 anyway. 
10 MR. MCKAY: I guess whatever it took to get to 
11 the closing, they made it there. 
12 THE COURT: Well, let me see the closing. 
13 documents and how that ties in. 
14 MR. BARON: Okay. It's been hard for me to just 
15 sit here and listen. But just once again, the alleged 
16 interference with the workmen occurred a year ago, either 
17 in January or February of last year. How that could put 
18 him behind from July 1st clear to November, no clue. Once 
19 again we allege that didn't even happen but what he's 
20 alleging is just a bunch of smoke screen. It's just a 
21 bunch of things that mean nothing with regard to the 
22 essential facts of the case. I'd be very interested to see 
23 what Kristen had signed. If she signed a contract to 
24 purchase or a deed perhaps they would have some kind of a 
29 
1 point with regard to at least her agreeing to sell but once 
2 again, when the original document was signed, Mr. Jones 
3 felt like Mr. Bowen had an interest and he had him sign the 
4 lease and the option on both of those lease and options. 
5 So, apparently he believed he had an interest and yet he's 
6 relying on one party to sell the property somehow. And 
7 what he's going to do is he's got someone lined up there. 
8 He wants to sell it to my clients for one price and him 
9 take the profit. Now he's calling us bad guys simply 
10 because we didn't let him exercise his expired option and 
11 we want it to either sell it or (inaudible). 
12 Your Honor, I'm very frustrated with this but I 
13 have no problem with counsel providing copies of whatever 
14 they have as far as the closing documents. I have seen 
15 them prior to today but I think that based on the 
16 affidavits and what's been submitted that we certainly are 
17 entitled to summary judgment. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'll take a look at 
19 what's been presented. 
20 MR. MCKAY: Would the Court consider my client 
21 testifying? 
22 THE COURT: No. That wouldn't be appropriate 
23 today. It's by affidavit and that, it's not an evidentiary 
24 hearing today so, -
25 I MR. MCKAY: Thank you, your Honor. 
30 
1 THE COURT: And it's based on the law, you know, 
2 and you can submit it in an affidavit form. I'll allow you 
3 to supplement though as to the statute of frauds argument. 
4 MR. MCKAY: Thank you, your Honor. 
5 I MR. BARON: Thank you, your Honor. 
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2 HONORABLE PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: After spending some considerable time 
5 on this case, I thought this might be the best way to 
6 approach getting the decision out. I worked on it last 
7 week and realized that probably in preparing the written 
8 decision I was having to put a lot of background 
9 information in. That probably won't be necessary for me to 
10 just give you my decision. I understand that there will be 
11 findings necessary. 
12 First of all, I'll state that I am going to grant 
13 the motion for summary judgment. And I'll explain why and 
14 give you my findings in connection with that. I also want 
15 you to know that I had a law clerk, our law clerk working 
16 on this at least two different occasions. This has turned 
17 out to be a fairly complicated situation although--and let 
18 me tell you the other problem I'm having with this is that 
19 although this is the plaintiff's motion for summary 
20 judgment, in assessing with the factual issues, it almost 
21 essentially decides issues on the other side when there is 
22 no counterclaim pending. And I understand that that's the 
23 consequence of it. I just don't see anyway around it. In 
24 order for me to get to the point to say that whether there 
25 are or aren't issues of fact, I have to make that 
1 
1 determination. 
2 At any rate, first of all, I want to address it 
3 in this context. Looking at the issue regarding the 
4 expiration of the option. My understanding of the position 
5 of the parties is that it's the first option that was 
6 entered into that's at issue, the first written option that 
7 was signed by both the plaintiffs. The second option, 
8 taking the position and taking all inferences in favor of 
9 the defendant, the second option was signed at the closing 
10 or the attempted closing on the sale of the property and it 
11 was essentially considered a bogus kind of transaction. 
12 So, I basically disregarded the second option as being of 
13 any real value in this case. That's essentially how it was 
14 presented to me and that's basically taking it with all 
15 inferences in favor of the defense. 
16 Clearly by it terms, the written option, the 
17 first option, has expired. It expired before the attempted 
18 closing on the property. There's no question that it was 
19 expired. The question, I guess, then becomes whether there 
20 was some kind of an extension given by Kristen Horton, an 
21 oral extension. And I suppose that may be a disputed 
22 factual issue to the extent that it is a material issue. 
23 The problem with it is that the law is clear that Michael 
24 Bowen, the joint owner of he property, is required under 
25 I the statute of frauds to enter into any kind of a written 
2 
1 extension on the option, it having expired. 
2 Going back over the divorce decree, it is clear 
3 to me from the divorce decree that Michael Bowen continued 
4 to have an interest in the property. The divorce decree 
5 essentially states exactly that. The plaintiff in this 
6 case, Kristen Horton, was awarded a possessory interest but 
7 it also states in the divorce decree that the parties agree 
8 that the defendant shall maintain an interest in the home. 
9 The term interest goes far beyond just some kind 
10 of a lien or some kind of ultimate wish to get some value 
11 out of it. It, interest in a, a property interest in a 
12 piece of property has legal significance. The divorce . 
13 decree specifically maintains that he has an interest in 
14 the home. Having an interest in the home, therefore, 
15 requires that if there is any transfer of the property or 
16 extensions on options, those types of things, has to have 
17 his approval. And it's undisputed that he did not act in 
18 any way that would approve the extension on the option. I 
19 had the clerk go through, make sure that there were no 
20 allegations to that affect and my understanding is he did 
21 not make any oral agreement to extend the option. 
22 On the other hand, Kristen Plortin did clearly. 
23 And that's, but that's neither here nor there. She cannot 
24 bind him. There is no husband and wife exception to the 
25 statute of frauds. Part performance by one, even if I were 
3 
1 to assume that her behavior by appearing at the closing and 
2 signing certain closing documents was partial performance 
3 and therefore requires that any kind of oral extension be 
4 enforced, the problem with that is that it still requires 
5 Michael Bowen to participate in that and that's a matter of 
6 law. 
7 The other issue that was raised was whether by 
8 some of his behavior, Michael Bowen should be estopped from 
9 asserting some kind of a claim that his assent is required 
10 for this transaction to go through. That ordinarily would 
11 be a fact sensitive issue also. However, even if you 
12 assume all facts favorable to the defense in this case that 
13 Michael Bowen interfered and caused some problems with 
14 exercising the option in a timely way, it also requires 
15 that, on the other side that there be performance on the 
16 option or the extension. And the problem with that is the 
17 option was also tied to the lease which required rental 
18 payments and it's undisputed in the case that the defendant 
19 in this case did not make timely rental payments. And, 
20 therefore, under theories of equity, a party cannot come 
21 and ask for equity from the Court if they have not complied 
22 with all terms of the agreement assuming it was enforceable 
23 in equity. And those are my reasons. 
24 I want to just add also about the divorce decree, 
25 I I recognize that there was some reliance on the section 
4 
1 that stated that the parties were to cooperate in signing 
2 off on all titles and those types of things. Paragraph 21 
3 of the Divorce Decree states that each party or their heir 
4 assigned shall immediately deliver all personal property 
5 awarded to the other party in their possession and execute 
6 and deliver all documents and titles necessary to affect a 
7 property transfer as ordered in the decree of divorce to be 
8 entered herein. The problem with the reliance on that is 
9 that that paragraph relates to the property transfer as 
10 ordered by the decree of divorce. The decree of divorce 
11 did not order that the property be sold and it didn't 
12 order, and it doesn't identify who it was that was supposed 
13 to actually sell the property. The plaintiff in that case, 
14 Kristen Hortin, had a possessory interest, both parties 
15 maintained an interest in the home. The paragraph relating 
16 to the transfer of documents relates to whatever other 
17 property was transferred back and forth. I don't know if 
18 they involves cars, those would be types of things like 
19 that. Titles to vehicles. It specifically says shall 
20 deliver all documents and titles necessary to affect a 
21 property transfer as ordered in the Decree of Divorce. I 
22 don't see anything in the decree that orders that the home 
23 be sold or that gives Kristen Hortin the sole 
24 responsibility to sell it. I think it is significant in 
25 I this case, also, that the defendant in this case is a 
5 
1 realtor and I guess I think that some of the case law makes 
2 the point where there were attorneys involved in 
3 transaction. I think with real estate, when someone has 
4 some expertise in real estate, a certain level of knowledge 
5 can be imputed to them. It should have been fairly 
6 apparent that Mr. Bowen needed to participate and sign off 
7 on these things. The fact that he didn't is fatal to the 
8 transaction. Therefore, I'm going to grant the motion for 
9 summary judgment. 
10 And since we're here on it. I don't know, I'm 
11 going to ask plaintiff in this case to, plaintiff's counsel 
12 to prepare the findings of fact and conclusions. 
13 MR. BARON: I will, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: You can get a copy of this tape if it 
15 will be helpful to you. 
16 MR. BARON: Very good. 
17 THE COURT: And in terms of answering any 
18 questions about the other. 
19 As far as other issues relating to the unlawful 
20 detainer, the back rent that's due, those types of things. 
21 I don't know where we stand and I haven't sat down to try 
22 to figure out what it might be. I realize some substantial 
23 time has past. Is Mr. Jones still in the property? 
24 MR. MCKAY: Yes. 
25 J MR. BARON: He is, he's still there. 
6 
1 THE COURT: Okay. Well, -
2 MR. BARON: I'll just compute that, your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: All right. Do you want to just 
4 compute it and run it past Mr. McKay and then see if you 
5 can't agree on what that is. 
6 MR. BARON: Very good. 
7 THE COURT: And submit the documents approved as 
8 to form so I can go ahead and just get them signed. 
9 MR. BARON: Thank you, your Honor. 
10 MR. MCKAY: Just to make sure I understand. 
11 Could you address the unlawful detainer portion? 
12 THE COURT: Well, because he's basically, the 
13 conclusion is the option is expired. He does not have an 
14 interest in this property. Now, I will say this as an 
15 aside, frankly. This does not address this issue about 
16 whether he has any claim against Kristen Hortin for any of 
17 the reliance that he had on things that she may have done 
18 and said to him. I'm just saying as a matter of law, he's 
19 not, he can't force the sale and make Mr. Bowen go through 
20 with it. Unfortunately, anything that Kristen Hortin may 
21 have done, if, in fact, that's found to have happened, if 
22 she, in fact, did not act in a fair and honest way dealing 
23 with Mr. Jones, he may have a claim against her, you know. 
24 This doesn't preclude anything like that. But it's just 
25 that this wasn't a part of this action. I'm just saying as 
7 
1 a matter of law when you have to look at joint owners of 
2 property, there is certain legal requirements before the 
3 Court can recognize that there has been a transfer and 
4 that's with the Statute of Frauds. 
5 MR. BARON: One question I would have for counsel 
6 is, is Mr. Jones going to move out on his own or we need 
7 the sheriff involved? 
8 MR. MCKAY: We haven't talked about that. 
9 THE COURT: Maybe you can talk about it now 
10 before you all leave and work that out together. I don't 
11 know that you, obviously you're entitled to it. And when I 
12 get the documents, I'll sign them. 
13 MR. BARON: Are we clear on that they're, not 
14 only is this Court ruling that the option expired but that 
15 he is also in unlawful detainer? 
16 THE COURT: I'm granting the motion for summary 
17 judgment but I had to, frankly, normally I wouldn't have 
18 dealt with all the issues about the option except that were 
19 raised in defense. Therefore, I felt like I had to. If I 
20 didn't, you know, if there weren't factual issues relating 
21 to those defenses. The primary issues, I'm granting the 
22 motion for summary judgment on the unlawful detainer 
23 finding that he is currently in a position of being a 
24 renter rather than having an interest in the property. And 



































the rent. That's 
attorney's fees? 
fees? 
MR. BARON: We had a s k e d f o r a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s , 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: And wha t , I b e l i e v e -
MR. MCKAY: So d i d we. 
THE COURT: What - pardon me? 
MR. MCKAY: I'm just saying both sides asked for 
attorneys' fees. 
THE COURT: Yeah, I guess what I'm asking, what 
is the basis for attorneys' fees? If it's the agreement, I 
think the agreement expired. 
MR. BARON: That's true, I would just as soon 
you'd cite pay your own attorney's fees. We would ask for 
any out of pocket costs that we've expended. 
THE COURT: Okay. As the prevailing party you 
are entitled to costs and if you're willing to just back 







3 expired and 
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1 not have stated all the findings as articulately as I 
2 should have so I would appreciate it if you would make 
3 sure, you know, that everything is included that should be 
4 in terms of purposes of perfecting an appeal on all of 
5 that. 
6 Okay. Thank you, Mr. Baron, 
7 MR. MCKAY: Thank you, your Honor. 
8 MR. BARON: Thank you. 
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